Court of Appeal reopens scope of inquest in domestic abuse death

On 22 April 2026 at Winchester Crown Court the jury found Christopher Trybus not guilty of manslaughter, rape and controlling and coercive behaviour against his wife Tarryn. Tarryn took her own life and the prosecution’s case was that she was led to do so by reason of the abusive behaviour that she was subjected to by her husband. This acquittal followed just 12 days after Lee Milne was sentenced to eight years in prison for culpable homicide in Glasgow. The case against him was that his wife had been driven to suicide following an 18-month campaign of domestic abuse. Albeit different jurisdictions and different outcomes, these cases show a clear and growing focus within the criminal justice system on the potential causative potency of domestic abuse when a partner takes their own life.

Also, on 22 April 2026 the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in the case of  R (O’Brien) v HM Assistant Coroner for Sefton, Knowsley and St Helens [2026] EWCA 499 (Lord Justice Edis giving the leading judgment, with Lady Justice Whipple and Lord Justice Newey agreeing) allowing the Claimant’s appeal and quashing a coroner’s decision to restrict the scope of an inquest into a death following prolonged domestic abuse.

Linda O’Brien died in May 2020 after falling from a window in her flat. The evidence indicated a toxic and violent relationship with her partner, Alan McMahon, who was subject to a restraining order prohibiting him from attending her address. Police had attended the flat on 7 April 2020 following a 999-call reporting screaming but failed to identify the restraining order and did not arrest Mr McMahon. He was present in the flat on the night Linda O’Brien died, around a month later.

The Assistant Coroner decided that the inquest should focus solely on events immediately surrounding the death (8–9 May 2020), excluding earlier police involvement from detailed investigation. On that basis, he determined that: (i) there was no sufficient causal link between any act or omission of the police and the death, (ii) the inquest should proceed without a jury, and (iii) Article 2 ECHR was not engaged.

A claim for judicial review was dismissed in the High Court. The claimant appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the coroner’s approach was premature and irrational.

Three key points of the judgment may be summarised as follows:

First, the Court emphasised that the coroner applied the wrong test for causation. By stating that “it simply cannot be known” whether earlier arrest would have prevented the death, the coroner set the bar too high. The proper question was whether, on the balance of probabilities, earlier police action might have made a material contribution to preventing the death.

Secondly, the coroner reached his conclusions without investigating readily available, highly relevant material, including: (i) the partner’s antecedent criminal history, (ii) sentencing practice for breach of restraining orders, (iii) CPS charging decisions in domestic abuse cases, and (iv) bail decision‑making where there is a demonstrated pattern of violent and coercive conduct. The Court rejected the notion that such matters were inherently speculative. Criminal justice outcomes are governed by structured frameworks — the CPS Code, Sentencing Council Guidelines, and the Bail Act — which permit a reasoned assessment of probable outcomes.

Thirdly, the Court criticised the High Court for substituting its own factual findings for a supervisory review of the coroner’s reasoning. The issue was not whether the judge agreed with the coroner’s conclusion on causation, but whether the coroner had lawfully curtailed a reasonable line of enquiry too early.

This judgment places strong emphasis on the dynamics of domestic abuse and coercive control. The Court noted that the deceased had planned an escape route, there was evidence of recent assault injuries unrelated to the fall, continued tolerance of the abuser’s presence did not negate risk, and courts and decision‑makers are required to approach domestic abuse as an escalating and potentially lethal pattern of behaviour. These considerations were central to assessing both causation and the realism of custodial outcomes had the restraining order breach been addressed properly.

The appeal was allowed and the coroner’s decision quashed. The matter has been remitted to a different coroner for reconsideration of the scope of the inquest, whether there is reason to suspect that acts or omissions of the police may have caused or contributed to the death (triggering a jury inquest), and whether Article 2 ECHR is engaged.

This decision is an important appellate reminder that coroners must avoid foreclosing lines of enquiry at the scoping stage, must ground causation assessments in proper legal frameworks rather than assumptions about “unknowable” outcomes, and take particular care in cases involving domestic abuse, where earlier failures by the state may have fatal consequences weeks or months later.

The judgment reinforces a robust, protective approach to inquest scope and highlights the low threshold for including police conduct and Article 2 considerations at an early stage.

Article by Emma Zeb KC