Did you miss? Pridewell Properties (London) Ltd v Spirit Pub Company (Managed) Ltd

Pridewell Properties (London) Ltd v Spirit Pub Company (Managed) Ltd [2026] EWHC 953 (Ch)  ·  Mr Justice Fancourt  ·  24 April 2026

The facts  

Lina Mattsson, led by Mark Warwick KC, acted for the Appellant landlord, a single-purpose vehicle formed to redevelop The Railway Bell, a public house. Its scheme involved building three mews houses in the beer garden and converting the upper floors to flats. Planning permission had not yet been obtained as the landlord needed to carry out acoustic surveys and intrusive structural investigations before the application could be submitted to the Local Authority. The lease did not include any such access rights and the tenant refused access. Expert witnesses agreed that in the circumstances a realistic timeline to the start of construction was 10 to 14 months from the possession date. 

HHJ Hellman sitting in the Mayor’s and City of London Court held (amongst other things) that this was a “reasonable time” and that the ground of opposition was therefore satisfied on the timing point, but held that ground (f) was not satisfied on the “narrow ground” that the landlord had not shown that it had a real prospect of obtaining funding for the development. The landlord appealed and the tenant put in a Respondent Notice which challenged, amongst other things, the judge’s finding on the timing point – an issue of wider legal significance.  

The appeal  

Fancourt J held that the trial judge had not erred when holding that the landlord had not established that it had a real prospect of obtaining funding for the development. That issue disposed of the appeal. Fancourt J, noting the wider importance of the timing point proceeded to consider the tenant’s grounds in the Respondent Notice, albeit on the basis that those grounds were obiter dictum. 

On the timing point Fancourt J held that the trial judge had asked himself the wrong question. The judge had assessed whether a 10–14 month delay was reasonable in the circumstances — essentially, whether it was justified or excusable given the practical constraints the landlord faced. That is not what the statute requires. Fancourt J traced the case law carefully. The Court of Appeal in Reohorn v Barry Corporation [1956] had established that a landlord need not have contractors on site the day after possession — some modest delay is tolerated. But the language used was deliberate: “… it means … that the work will begin, not at any long delayed time, but on the termination of the tenancy.” 

Fancourt J also clarified what Jay J had actually decided in S Franses Ltd v Cavendish Hotel (London) Ltd [2017]. That decision was not authority for a broad “reasonableness” test. Jay J had in mind two distinct questions: how long was the delay likely to be, and could that delay properly be described as within the statutory tolerance — not whether the delay was excusable. 

Fancourt J held that the statutory tolerance exists to accommodate the modest practical steps needed to mobilise once possession is obtained: securing and clearing the property, getting contractors on site, and so on. It does not accommodate a landlord that cannot yet set about the works because something else must be achieved first. If a landlord intends to set about works immediately on recovering possession, it satisfies the test — even if there is some short delay before the first tool is lifted. The fact that the prior step was outside the landlord’s control, or caused by the tenant’s lawful refusal to permit access, is irrelevant. That is simply the consequence of the parties’ bargain. 

Applied to the facts: the landlord could not even submit a planning application until post-possession surveys were complete. It intended to apply for a contentious planning permission six or seven months after taking possession. That was not intending to do the works “on termination” — it was intending to do them after a substantial further period whose duration was itself uncertain. 

Key takeaway  

Pridewell will have huge ramifications for many landlords with redevelopment ambitions. Ground (f) is not satisfied simply because a delay in starting works is understandable or inevitable  — the question is whether, given that delay, the landlord can genuinely be said to intend to carry out the works on the termination of the tenancy. The practical consequences of Fancourt J’s analysis are significant. 

If a landlord cannot obtain planning permission — for whatever reason — until after the trial, ground (f) is likely to fail. The same risk arises where works have long technical lead times that push the realistic start date well beyond the possession date. The judgment also signals that a tenant’s refusal to grant pre-possession access, however frustrating, will not rescue a landlord whose timetable is already too long: that is simply the consequence of the parties’ bargain. 

Landlords and their advisers should now consider three things. First, whether future leases should include express rights of access for survey and investigation work, so that planning applications can be advanced before possession. Second, whether it may be prudent — in some cases — to commence ground (f) works such as demolition works promptly on recovering possession, even though this makes little practical or financial sense, to bring the start date within the statutory window. Third, whether a short new lease with an access right or a redevelopment break option better serves their position than opposing renewal outright. 

Although obiter, the analysis is authoritative and is likely to be followed consistently in the county court, where ground (f) disputes are almost always decided. There is also a broader question as to whether the operation of ground (f) is now fit for purpose in complex urban redevelopments and when planning applications take months — and whether that is a matter to which the Law Commission might usefully turn its attention. 

Article by Lina Mattsson