Two recent cases on pleading and proving a counterfactual in professional negligence claims

Two recent decisions show the importance of: (a) pleading; (b) being able to prove, a counterfactual in professional negligence cases.
Siem & Ors v Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP [2026] EWHC 1168 (Ch)
In this case, the Claimants alleged that the Defendant’s professional negligence caused them the lose an opportunity to earn substantial profits from the redevelopment of a property in Kensington (“the Property”) as follows:
- The Property was sub-divided into a number of flats.
- The First Claimant, Mr Siem, owned the ground floor flat. The upper floor flat was owned by a Cayman company, Somerset Properties Limited (“SPL”).
- The Third Defendant, Mr Wake, was a property developer who saw redevelopment potential in the property and therefore wanted to acquire both the ground floor flat and the upper floor flat.
- Mr Siem and Mr Wake agreed between themselves that the redevelopment would be structured through an SPV which they both part owned, with Mr Siem contributing the ground floor flat and cash, and Mr Wake contributing the property redevelopment expertise.
- In order to purchase the upper floor flat, Mr Siem and Mr Wake intended to purchase the shares in SPL. Mr Wake therefore engaged the Defendant firm.
A significant and interesting part of the case concerned whether a duty of care was owed by the Defendant firm to Mr Siem, in circumstances where the retainer was with Mr Wake. This article concentrates on causation and the counterfactual issue.
The Claimants’ case on causation relied on two counterfactuals (i.e. what position would they have been in, but for the alleged negligence).
The “Primary Counterfactual” was that is if the Defendant had not: (i) in its draft SPA of September 2017, negligently required unnecessary protections for the Claimants (in the form of a retention clause – which was said to be unnecessary in light of the possibility of alternative warranty protection); (ii) negligently failed to comply with Mr Wake’s instructions given on 19 October 2017 that the retention clause needed to be dropped because he had been told by the selling side that it was a deal-breaker, then an SPA would have been entered into in Autumn 2017 and the deal would have gone ahead.
The “Alternative Counterfactual” was that, had the Defendants disclosed their own negligence on the issue of the warranty retention provision, Mr Siem would not have, in January 2018, have withdrawn from the transaction blaming Mr Wake for the fact that the deal did not get over the line.
The discussion is at [210]-[234]. The discussion is in part notable due to the absence of evidence from the selling side.
The Claimants argued that, but for the Defendant’s breaches, Mr Siem would have entered into the SPA by 3 November 2017, on substantially the same terms as the September draft, but with alternative security arrangements and an agreed completion date.
The counterfactual is complex but the Defendant essentially made two points as to what Mr Siem would in fact be more likely to have done.
First, that he would have insisted on not merely “adequate” security, but rather the strongest form of security, and so would have insisted on the retention clause. The Judge considered various counterfactual forms of security, rejecting tracing provisions and a Citibank guarantee as being unrealistic, before finding that the Defendant would eventually have proposed a Non-Distribution Undertaking, which both parties would have agreed to.
Second, the Defendant said that Mr Siem would not have complied with the timescales envisaged by the selling side. The Judge found that the SPA probably could have been negotiated quicker (by looking in part at what actually did happen and the ebbs and flows in the negotiation timetable), saying that issues and the absence of final tax advice would not have prevented the agreements from being completed earlier. However, the Judge found that Mr Siem would have insisted on a six-month gap between exchange and completion to compensate for the high purchase price.
The Judge therefore found that the selling side would probably have issued an ultimatum by 19 October 2017, demanding agreement on the completion date, but that Mr Siem would have continued resisting until after 3 November 2017, causing the Selling Side to instruct its solicitors to stop work.
Therefore, the Claimants failed to establish their Primary Counterfactual, as the SPA would not have been signed by 3 November 2017. The Judge also considered it unlikely that Mr Siem would have proceeded later in November due to his growing concerns about the transaction, property market and Mr Wake’s abilities.
Accordingly, the Primary Counterfactual did not come up to proof.
Nor did the Alternative Counterfactual, based on evidence given by Mr Siem in cross-examination.
MW Eat Ltd v James Hallam [2026] EWHC 2673 (BP)
This is a case involving an insurance broker’s negligence.
The Claimant chain of restaurants was the holder of a policy which did not cover (above a £50,000 limit) losses suffered consequent on the COVID-19 pandemic and the government’s response to it.
The Claimant alleged that, but for the broker’s negligence, they would have entered into a “Correct Alternative Product”, which would have done.
The Correct Alternative Product was defined as:
“an insurance policy (or policies) which would have provided adequate protection relative to the 1st Claimant’s turnover, in respect of losses caused by diseases such as, but not limited to, SARS, as well as losses caused by general non-damage denial of access to the Restaurants (“the Correct Alternative Product”). Among other things, any financial limit in the Correct Alternative Product would have been per restaurant and not as a total across all the restaurants”
Although not appearing as part of that definition of the Correct Alternative Product, when the Particulars of Claim were read as a whole it was clear that it meant a policy which had certain minimum features. In brief, it was a policy which:
- could have included losses arising from COVID-19 pursuant to disease coverage (on one of a number of specified bases);
- had limits which reflected “adequate protection relative to [C1]’s turnover“;
- provided that any financial limits were on a per restaurant basis; and
- had NDDA cover with an indemnity period greater than 3 months.
However, what the Particulars of Claim did not set out were:
- Whether the hypothetical policy needed to be as good as or better than the policy which had in fact been taken out in other ways, e.g. with the same level of property damage or business interruption “all risks” coverage, similar levels of excess or other features.
- The range of premium which the Claimant would have been willing to pay.
- The minimum indemnity period or relevant indemnity limits (“adequate” was not defined).
- What loss it is claimed would have been avoided from entry into the Correct Alternative Product. The Particulars of Claim claimed: (i) the whole of the Lockdown Loss on the basis that it “would have been covered by the Correct Alternative Product,” (ii) “alternatively such sums as would have been covered” and (iii) alternatively, damages on a loss of chance basis. However, owing to the first three deficiencies above, there was no basis for the first head of loss, and no basis for calculating the second alternative head of loss.
The Judge concluded by saying that: “That lack of definition matters because it leaves D, in effect, being asked to meet an allegation that a policy meeting a range of vaguely defined characteristics existed, could have been negotiated, or could have been assembled through some combination of available products. That exercise requires D to supply some crucial missing content of the Claimants’ own counterfactual case.”
Takeaways
In some cases, the counterfactual world is more complex, with more permutations; and in others it is more simple, with fewer permutations.
In order to counteract this, Claimants may be tempted to leave their counterfactual at the pleading stage more open-ended. However, doing so runs the risk that the Defendant does not understand the case they have to meet.
The reality is that the more pathways in the counterfactual world that there are, the more work it is going to take to persuade a Judge that the Claimant (and any third party) would have walked down a particular one. This may be particularly difficult in cases involving business negotiations, including negotiations with third parties like the sellers in Siem.
Article by Thomas Mitty
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