Alternative service appropriately ordered in a Hague Service Convention case

 Mitchell and others (in their capacity as joint liquidators of MBI International & Partners Inc) v Al Jaber (also known as Sheikh Mohammed Bin Issa Al-Jaber) and others [2026] EWHC 1947 (Ch)

What was the background?

The claimants, acting as the joint liquidators of MBI International & Partners Inc, had obtained a final judgment against the first defendant, Sheikh Mohamed bin Issa Al Jaber, for more than €67 million, which was reinstated by the Supreme Court in Mitchell v Al Jaber [2025] UKSC 43 after the Court of Appeal had set it aside. A final charging order was subsequently made over the first defendant’s London property, securing more than €83 million including interest. The present Part 8 proceedings sought possession and sale of that property to enforce the charging order.

The judgment was given by Deputy Master Holden in the High Court on an interlocutory application by the first defendant to set aside an order permitting the claim form to be served out of the jurisdiction by an alternative method, namely by email to his English solicitors. Before the claim was issued, the claimants unsuccessfully attempted to deliver a pre-action letter to the first defendant’s Paris address. His solicitors confirmed that they acted for him but had no authority to accept service of the proposed proceedings.

The issue for the court was whether there was a sufficient basis under CPR 6.15 to authorise alternative service on a defendant resident in France, a contracting state to the Hague Service Convention. Although the application initially proceeded on the footing that ‘exceptional circumstances’ were required, the parties ultimately agreed that the applicable test was whether there was ‘good reason’ to permit alternative service. The court therefore had to determine whether that test was satisfied and whether the earlier order authorising service by email should stand.

What did the court decide?

The court dismissed the first defendant’s application and upheld the order authorising service by email on his solicitors. Applying CPR 6.15, the court held that where the defendant resides in a Hague Service Convention state that has not objected to Article 10(a), the relevant question is whether there is ‘good reason’ to authorise an alternative method of service. Deputy Master Holden adopted the summary of the governing principles in M v N [2021] EWHC 360 (Comm) and accepted that the previously asserted requirement for ‘exceptional circumstances’ did not apply. The court also considered Gorbachev v Guriev [2022] EWCA Civ 1270; [2023] KB 1, Cecil v Bayat [2011] EWCA Civ 135, Société Générale v Goldas Kuyumculuk Sanayi Ithalat Ihracat AS [2018] EWCA Civ 1093 and Addax BV Geneva Branch v Coral Suki SA [2004] EWHC 2882 (Comm).

The court found several cumulative reasons establishing good reason. First, the proceedings were, in substance, enforcement proceedings following lengthy litigation culminating in a final Supreme Court judgment, making the prompt progress of enforcement a legitimate objective. Secondly, the unexplained failure to collect the pre-action letter at the Paris address, coupled with the solicitors’ refusal to accept service despite continuing to act for the first defendant, indicated a real possibility that the service requirements were being exploited to delay the proceedings.

Thirdly, if the failure to receive the pre-action correspondence reflected a genuine practical difficulty rather than a tactical choice, that itself justified alternative service because the same difficulty could recur if service were attempted through the Convention procedures. Service by email on solicitors already fully engaged in the litigation was also more likely to bring the proceedings promptly to the first defendant’s attention, consistent with the underlying purpose of service. The court rejected the argument that the claimants were required to attempt Convention service before seeking an order under CPR 6.15.

The court further held that the second defendant’s pending application for permission to appeal against the charging order and for a stay had no bearing on whether alternative service should be authorised. It also rejected the allegation that the claimants had breached their duty of full and frank disclosure, concluding that they had identified the correct legal test and adequately disclosed the relevant correspondence with the first defendant’s solicitors. Accordingly, the Alternative Service Order remained in force and the first defendant’s application was dismissed.

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What are the practical implications of this case?

This judgment highlights the restrictive and cautious approach which Courts take to technical service arguments. The possibility of service by alternative means has always been recognised as an important tool in civil litigation and there are a variety of methods by which Courts can ensure that it does not operate so as to cause prejudice or injustice. The suggestion in this case that “exceptional circumstances” were needed to justify alternative service by alternative means in a Hague Service Convention case was importantly rejected. It also highlights an important distinction between proceedings aimed at the enforcement of an existing substantive judgment and the commencement of original substantive proceedings. In the latter case, the person on whom service is to be effected will already be fully appraised of the circumstances leading up to the need for service. There is justifiably reason for the Court to be more inclined to order service by alternative means in such cases. Finally, it highlights the importance in cases of applications for service by alternative means to attempt communication with the person on whom service is to be effected first by conventional methods and to clearly evidence any such attempt. In this case, the “Paris Letter”, as it came to be called in the judgment was a significant factor in the Court’s reasoning and the Claimant’s detailed evidence in relation to it proved significant.

Case details

• Court: High Court of Justice, Business and Property Courts of England and Wales, Property, Trusts and Probate List (ChD)
• Judge: Deputy Master Holden
• Date of judgment: 29/7/2026

Article written by Phillip Patterson, first published by LexisNexis