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Backdating the Fiction: The Court of Appeal Says No

Articles
16 Nov 2026

Lost modern grant has always asked the courts to presume that a deed granting a right of way was once signed and has since gone missing. In The Kingdom Hall Trust v Davies [2026] EWCA Civ 1377, the Court of Appeal decided that even this fiction has its limits. Clare Anslow and Priya Gopal discuss the Court of Appeal’s decision and its implications for those seeking to establish prescriptive rights.

Factual background

Mr Davies claimed to have acquired a right of way (both pedestrian and vehicular) over a car park at the rear of the Telford Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses for the benefit of his property at Pleasington, Telford. Kingdom Hall and Pleasington were in common ownership until February 1958 when Pleasington was sold off. Kingdom Hall was originally a cinema but from 17 July 1967 it had been held on charitable trusts.

Section 29 of the Charities Act 1960 (in force for most of the period) prohibited the disposal of land forming part of the permanent endowment of a charity, or occupied for the purposes of a charity, without an order of the court or the consent of the Charity Commissioners.

The FTT found that Mr Davies and his predecessors in title had used the claimed way openly and as of right between 24 August 1977 and 11 February 2021; but rejected the claim to earlier use.  The FTT accepted that after 17 July 1967 (when the land became charity land) there was no competent grantor. The UT restated and upheld that conclusion. It was common ground that throughout the period of the proven use, there was no competent grantor and that was the assumption on which the appeal was approached.

The FTT held it was entitled to presume the existence of a lost modern grant made at some time between 1958 (when the two properties ceased to be in common ownership) and 1967 (when they wee acquired for charitable purposes). That was a period of some 10 years before the use of the way began.

The UT summarised its conclusion was as follows:

“Once the distinction is clearly made between the “competent grantor” rule on the one hand, and the “user against the fee simple” rule on the other, there is no reason to suppose that the presumed grant need take place at any particular time (and in particular it need not take place immediately before the commencement of the relevant user), save that it must be since 1189 (or it would not be lost modern grant), and before the commencement of the minimum period of prescriptive user relied upon (or it could not justify that user); and it must be possible to identify a time within that period at which such a grant could have been made by a capable grantor (or it does not produce a lawful origin for the user); and the user relied upon must be user as of right by and against the fee simple for the appropriate period. But the user relied upon need not be user against a competent grantor.”

It is the last sentence of the passage above that was at the heart of the appeal. The effect of the decision of the UT is that a grant is presumed to have been made by the owner of the servient land at a time when there was no activity to which he could have objected; and no activity to which he acquiesced.

Decision

Following a detailed review of the case law, the CA found that the acquiescence and the capacity to grant are intertwined. If there is no user during the period in which there was a capable grantor, the requirements for acquiring a prescriptive easement are not satisfied. In this case, there had been no enjoyment against the owners of the servient land before it became charitable land, and without such use, there was no foundation for the presumption that any previous owner made the grant.

Case comment

As noted above, the Court of Appeal concluded that a prescriptive easement cannot be acquired against land held by a charity by presuming a fictional grant that pre-dated the land becoming charity land and the commencement of the use relied upon. Whilst that decision was reached specifically in the context of charity land, the analysis and conclusions of the Court of Appeal have much wider implications.

Firstly, the Court of Appeal highlighted the important relationship between the requirement for a capable grantor and acquiescence. For an easement to exist, the right must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant and it follows that there must be a competent grantor. There is no exception to this principle for easements acquired through long user. However, in this case, it was common ground that throughout the period of proven use, there was no competent grantor. The Upper Tribunal appeared to try and circumvent this problem by reasoning that the “user relied upon need not be user against a competent grantor”. In our view, the Court of Appeal was right to overturn the Upper Tribunal’s decision. Whilst lost modern grant is indeed a fiction, a grant simply cannot be presumed if there is no owner who could have acquiesced in the use or objected to the use.

Secondly, the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that a grant can only be presumed after the use has begun is sound. As Lewison LJ noted, the function of the doctrine of lost modern grant is not to “rewrite history” but rather to provide a justification for the continued long user. It is difficult to see how lost modern grant could even apply without any de facto use. The practical impact of this part of the decision is that claimants will not simply be able to rely on any earlier period of time when there was no use to support their prescription claim. The evidence will need to establish that there was indeed some earlier use for the period relied upon. This, in our experience, is often challenging, particularly for historic periods of time where record-keeping was sparse.

Thirdly, acquiescence was clearly at the core of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. Prescription operates so that an owner with knowledge of the user (or the means of acquiring that knowledge) who fails to stop it is regarded as having acquiesced. That requires user which a competent owner could have acquiesced in.

Fourthly, it is important to note that the reason why there was no competent grantor is not the central question, although it may provide some useful context. In this case, the land was charity land. Equally, it may be the case that the owner is subject to statutory restrictions, or consent may be required before a grant can be made (the Court of Appeal referred to Oakley v Boston [1976] QB 270, for example, which concerned glebe land). The more significant point, however, is the fact of there being no competent grantor. The Court of Appeal’s decision places servient owners (with land subject to restrictions on the grant of easements) on stronger ground to defend prescription claims.

One point which the Court of Appeal did not really grapple with is the position where user begins against a competent grantor but then continues against an incompetent grantor. Lewison LJ noted that there was no “theoretical objection to a presumed grant by the competent grantor at or after the beginning of the use but at a time before the incompetent grantor arrived on the scene”. However, the analysis was not taken further than this and is a point that will ultimately be tested in a case where this is in issue.

Fundamentally, the Court of Appeal’s decision confirms that lost modern grant cannot be used in respect of a period when there was no use and no competent grantor. It also provides an important message that acquiescence really is at the core of any prescription claim.


Article by Clare Anslow and Priya Gopal

Authors

Clare Anslow

Call: 2011

Priya Gopal

Call: 2014

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