PMC v CWM Taf Morgannwg University Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 1126

On 28 August 2025 the Court of Appeal handed down its hotly anticipated judgment in the case of PMC concerning the making of anonymity orders in personal injury cases.

Understandably, given its importance, there has been much commentary and analysis posted online in the week or so since the judgment was published. The critical questions, now that the dust has begun to settle are: where are we now when it comes to anonymity orders, and what is the approach that parties should adopt when seeking one? It is hoped that this article provides a useful ‘cut out and keep’ practical summary of the key issues and guidance given in the case:

1. The terminology used historically has not always been used consistently; it should be:

a. A ‘withholding order’ (a “WO”) is an order sought within Court proceedings to withhold or anonymise the names of a party or a witness, including withholding information that would identify that person;
b. A ‘reporting restrictions order’ (a “RRO”) is an order sought within Court proceedings which has the effect of restricting the reporting of material disclosed during those proceedings, whether in open Court or by the public availability of Court documents;
c. An ‘anonymity order’ (an “AO”) is an order made within Court proceedings which has the effect of both withholding or anonymising the names of a party or a witness and restricting the reporting of material disclosed during those proceedings whether in open Court or by the public availability of documents.

2. Thus, in short: WO + RRO = AO;

3. There is an inherent power in the Court, derived from the common law, to derogate from the principle of open justice in civil proceedings by making, within Court proceedings, both a WO and a RRO, where such an order is strictly necessary in the interests of justice. Such an application is made to protect the integrity of the Court’s proceedings in the interest of justice;

4. The critical importance of the common law principle of open justice principle was emphasised. Whilst the power to derogate from the principle of open justice exists, the Court must start from the position that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice. The balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification;

5. This limited common law power is not in the same category as an equitable injunction granted against the world (contra mundum), generally in relation to matters occurring outside Court proceedings, preventing the identification of people or information, founded on s. 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981;

6. s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 establishes that RROs may be granted in the specific cases to which its restricted terms apply. It is, however, possible to rely upon s. 11 when seeking an AO, if it applies;

7. Anonymity may be necessary in view of the risks posed in the circumstances of the case. The risks identified in the case law to date include: (i) risks to the safety of a party or a witness; (ii) risks to the health of a vulnerable person; and (iii) risks of a person suffering commercial ruin. AOs may also be made to protect a party to proceedings from the painful and humiliating disclosure of personal information about them where there was no public interest in its being publicised. But not all categories of risk can be envisaged in advance;

8. There are clear indications in the previously decided cases that the common law power can be deployed to protect the interest of vulnerable parties. Children and protected parties are generally vulnerable and are persons whom the Court should look to protect;

9. The Court of Appeal’s previous guidance in JX MX v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 96 (“Dartford”) remains, broadly speaking, good law and should be followed. In Dartford, Moore-Bick LJ indicated that the following principles should apply [at §35]:

(i) The hearing should be listed for hearing in public under the name in which the proceedings were issued, unless by the time of the hearing an anonymity order has already been made;
(ii) Because the hearing will be held in open court the press and members of the public will have a right to be present and to observe the proceedings;
(iii) The press will be free to report the proceedings, subject only to any order made by the judge restricting publication of the name and address of the claimant, his or her litigation friend (and, if different, the names and addresses of his or her parents) and restricting access by non-parties to documents in the court record other than those which have been anonymised (an “anonymity order”);
(iv) The judge should invite submissions from the parties and the press before making an anonymity order;
(v) Unless satisfied after hearing argument that it is not necessary to do so, the judge should make an anonymity order for the protection of the claimant and his or her family;
(vi) If the judge concludes that it is unnecessary to make an anonymity order, he should give a short judgment setting out his reasons for coming to that conclusion;
(vii) The judge should normally give a brief judgment on the application (taking into account any anonymity order) explaining the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the reasons for his decision to grant or withhold approval and should make a copy available to the press on request as soon as possible after the hearing;

10. The guidance in Dartford has, however, been modified/further explained:

a. The suggestion at §35(i) that the hearing of an application for an AO should be listed under the name of the child/protected party should not be followed; it would be better to avoid publicity being given to the name before the application for an AO is determined. The application can and should be listed either as ‘an application under CPR Part 21.10’ (or similar), or by reference to a three-letter pseudonym suggested in the application (the latter being preferable because it gives the case a unique identity). The name and identifying details of the claimant would thus not be mentioned in open Court unless the application was dismissed;
b. The evidence that needs to be adduced in support of an application for an AO in an approval context depends on the case. The essential circumstances of the case must be set out in the evidence. There is no presumption about the outcome of the application and no special rules exempting the applicant from producing the best available evidence in support of the application. The evidence need not, however, speculate as to future specific risks to the claimant. The fact that the risks to the party in question lay entirely in the future might mean that there would have to be reliance on generic evidence based on the adverse effects of publicity in earlier comparable cases;
c. In a case where the parties are aware that the media or other non-parties have published information about the case or have shown a specific interest in doing so, those non-parties ought to be notified of the Court’s consideration of the application so they can be heard if they wish. Where the media are present at an approval hearing they should be afforded an opportunity be heard on anonymity questions. However, in cases where no third party is known to have an existing interest in the case, the media do not need to be notified in advance of an anonymity application being made (the media will become aware after an AO is made because a copy has to be published on the judiciary’s website – they can then apply to set aside the AO if they so wish);

11. Although Dartford dealt only with AOs made in the context of approval applications pursuant to CPR r. 21.10, the principles expounded in that case (as now modified/further explained in PMC) apply equally to applications for AOs in personal injury actions brought by children or protected parties (i.e. they are not limited solely to approval applications);

12. There is no reason, as a matter of jurisdiction, why an AO should not be made (whether under the Court’s inherent common law jurisdiction, or pursuant to s. 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, where applicable) even if a WO was not made at the beginning of proceedings;

13. The fact that there has been previous publicity is not an automatic bar to the making of either a WO or a RRO; it is, however, an important factor for the Court to take into account when deciding whether to make such an order(s) and if so, in what terms. Previous media coverage may be a pointer against making an AO, or towards making only a prospective, forward-looking RRO;

14. Those making applications for an AO should do so as early as reasonably practicable in the litigation process;

15. Whilst a prospective AO may not totally prevent the possibility of so called ‘jigsaw identification’ (where there has already been some degree of publicity in the public domain), that is not a reason to refuse a claimant the protection afforded by such an order; and

16. Each case will ultimately be determined on its own facts.

Importantly, the Court of Appeal has highlighted that, in light of its judgment, there are now elements of the PF10 form (used in relation to approval applications) which are inappropriate and require revision. It is understood that the Personal Injury Bar Association intends to issue interim guidance relating to anonymity applications in personal injury cases, and to produce a standard form of order for interim use in approval applications pursuant to CPR r. 21.10, pending a revised PF10 being provided by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee. Watch this space!

Article by Jake Rowley